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White supremacist rhetoric has long been part of the American political tradition. 
However, not all white supremacist movements have adopted the same rhetorical strategy. 
Though the Ku Klux Klan has traditionally been treated as a single movement that has 
undergone periods of resurgence, attuning to the distinct discursive practices and effects of 
each resurgent movement reveals how discourse can shape political development. This 
report argues that treating the Reconstruction-era Klan as a different movement than the 
Klan of the early-twentieth century offers an opportunity to study the “work” that Klan 
discourse can do. During Reconstruction, “Ku-Klux” did more than refer to the group that 
invoked it. It was also a synecdoche for white paternalism, mystery, domination, secrecy, 
Democratic party politics, and the proper role of the federal government. “Ku-Klux” 
discourse served as a vehicle to preserve antebellum ideas while simultaneously 
shepherding in reunification. By focusing on the “work” of particular discourses, we can 
better understand the role of rhetoric and ideas, including white-supremacism, on the 
direction of American political development.  
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 Around 8:45pm on August 11, 2017, about two-hundred- and fifty men wearing 
khakis and carrying tiki torches marched from a field on the campus of the University of 
Virginia where they had gathered towards a statute of Thomas Jefferson on the 
university’s rotunda. Many of them were chanting “You will not replace us.” The group 
of men encountered some university students at the rotunda and the scene soon became 
violent, though not nearly as violent as the clash between protestors and counterprotestors 
the next morning on the streets of Charlottesville, VA. The events of August 12 left 
dozens injured and three dead, including Heather Heyer, a paralegal who was killed when 
one of the protesting white supremacists rammed his car into the crowd where Heyer was 
standing. The events of August 11th and August 12th were the result of the “Unite the 
Right” rally—a group that included members of the so-called “alt-right,” white 
nationalists, members of the Ku-Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, and others. The event was 
organized by Jason Kessler, a white supremacist who was unhappy with the city’s 
decision to rename Lee Park and remove the statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee 
for whom the park was named.  
 The phrase “you will not replace us” chanted by the crowd of white supremacists 
reflects their belief that the “white race” will soon be a powerless minority or extinct 
altogether—replaced by an alleged ““rising tide of color.”1 Interestingly, the mob did not 
 
1 “White Supremacists Adopt New Slogan: ‘You Will Not Replace Us,’” Anti-Defamation League, 
accessed August 12, 2019, https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-adopt-new-slogan-you-will-not-
replace-us. 
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just chant, explain, or even yell “you will not replace us.” Yes, they chanted it, but doing 
so they declared it. The phrase as used by this group is what philosopher of language J.L. 
Austin has called a “performative utterance.”2 It has no meaning until it is spoken, and its 
meaning is derived from the act of being spoken. The meaning of the phrase cannot be 
fully determined outside of the context in which it was spoken. While the men who 
chanted it may be hoping to not be replaced in a literal sense, they are also giving heavy 
credence to the “us”—the group whose political and social power they fear is slipping 
away. Each man individually is of course not afraid of being “replaced”—their whiteness 
is here to stay. Instead, they are declaring that whiteness will not be deconstructed or 
challenged. The “whiteness” they hope to preserve is not anyone’s understanding of 
whiteness, but their own specific brand of what it means to be White in America. They 
are not describing a state of affairs, nor—no matter how much they might want it to 
become the case—are they saying what is the case. The meaning of “you shall not replace 
us,” therefore, can only be understood in its context.  
 This is not the first time this rhetoric has been espoused in the United States. It 
has been a staple of white supremacists—notably the Ku Klux Klan—since at least 
Reconstruction. But what purpose does the rhetoric serve? The rhetoric is not simply a 
byproduct of the political goals of white supremacists. It serves a purpose in its own 
right. Seeing the patterns and deviations in the meaning of this rhetoric reveals that we 
should not only pay attention to what groups like the white supremacists in 
 
2 J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, 3d ed (Oxford [Eng.] ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
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Charlottesville do, but also to what they say and how they say it. They are not only 
attempting to remake politics through violence or other action. They are also striving to 
remake politics through language and ideas. It does not matter that many or perhaps all of 
the people who use this language are unaware that their attempt at political action is two-
pronged. Whether they realize it or not, they are waging a battle of rhetoric and ideas and 
attempting to change the grammar of politics.  
 Not all white supremacist movements in the United States have adopted the same 
rhetorical strategy. The first two iterations of the Ku Klux Klan engaged with their 
similar political opportunities with sharply distinct discursive strategies. This may have 
some bearing on whether and how successful each movement was or can be. Though the 
Reconstruction-era Klan was mostly eradicated by 1873, it cannot be said that it failed to 
achieve many of its ideational goals. It successfully reasserted antebellum white 
paternalism and had a lasting impact on the place of “Ku-Klux” in American political 
discourse. By contrast, it seems the early-twentieth century Klan was less successful at 
achieving its ideational goals. This is in part because it did not have many. Its goals were 
more material. If it had any lasting impact on American political discourse, then much of 
it can be attributed its appropriation of the label held by its earlier, Reconstruction-era 
cousin.  
 It is important to notice the ways politics can be successfully remade through 
ideas and discourse. Not all political change happens at the level of material goods or 
institutional outcomes, though it is more easily measured that way. The ideational or 
discursive shifts can be just as important.  One can point to a moment of political 
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development more easily when it is more easily measured by a change in policy or a 
change in patterns of governance. It is less easily observed but no less important when 
political development happens on a discursive or grammatical level. Noticing how white 
supremacist movements have tried to remake politics through discourse gives us a better 
idea at how, why, or when they are able to be successful.  
 This paper analyzes how the first two iterations of the Ku Klux Klan engaged 
discursively with their respective political opportunities. Though the group that waged 
rampant political and racial violence throughout the South from 1866 until around 1872 
shared a name with the society that formed in 1915 but fell apart by 1923, they were very 
different movements. Though each was of course animated by similar ideas—principally 
white supremacy and a hatred of Blacks—they cannot always be treated as two parts of 
the same movement because they did not perform ideas or engage with extant American 
political discourse in the same way. They reassociated ideas and patterns of language 
differently. I take this approach to emphasize the “work” that particular discourses can 
do. If we are to better understand the discursive work of the white supremacists who 
organized in Charlottesville in August, 2017, for example, we need to place it in its 
historical context and analyze how it may be successfully altering the grammar of politics 
in ways its material efforts cannot.   
 My analysis proceeds in three parts. First, I analyze the Ku Klux Klan as a social 
movement. Doing this reveals the importance of distinguishing between the language, 
ideas, or discourse of an organization and the organization itself. In fact, one recent 
historian of the Klan, Elaine Fritz Parsons, argues persuasively that the Reconstruction-
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era Klan is better understand not as an organization but as an idea.3 Movements engage 
discursively with their respective political moment differently. This can have lasting 
impacts on politics. Second, I analyze the Reconstruction-era Klan’s discursive style in 
more detail and explain why it was able to hold and exercise such power. I emphasize 
how “Ku-Klux” was essential to the project of the Reconstruction-era Klan, but point out 
that no such parallel ideational project surrounded the second Klan. For the second Klan, 
“ku klux” was simply a referent to the group that invoked it. During Reconstruction, 
however, it was the other way around: The Klan meant Ku-Klux. Third, I bring my 
findings in conversation with what the literature tells us about political change. I argue a 
gap exists between what we know about the impact discourse can have on political 
change and how political scientists have understood political change. The existing 
literature can neither explain the differences between the first two iterations of the Klan, 
nor can it account for the performative project of meaning-creation of the Reconstruction-
era Klan. If we have any hope of understanding why the rhetoric of the white 
supremacists at Charlottesville persists in American political discourse, or whether it will 
have any lasting impact, we must develop a more robust explanation for the impact of 
ideas and discourse on American political development.  
 
 
3 Elaine Frantz Parsons, Ku Klux: The Birth of the Klan During Reconstruction. (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015). 
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I. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE KU KLUX KLAN 
Reconstruction-era racial violence did not start with the Ku-Klux Klan, nor was 
all racial or politically-motivated violence associated with the Klan. Yet, the Ku-Klux 
Klan formed among a group of bored, demobilized Confederate soldiers in Pulaski, TN in 
1866 who were concerned about the future of postwar politics.4 Some movement 
theorists studying the Klan assume it can be studied as a social movement.5 To be sure, 
the Klan certainly qualifies as a movement under almost any definition.6 The issue, 
though, is that the various iterations of the Klan did not look the same. Treating the Ku 
Klux Klan as a single social movement than began in 1866 and continues today means 
missing the ways in which each founding and re-founding of an organization calling itself 
the “Ku Klux Klan” was different. Though the first two iterations of the Klan were both 
animated by similar ideas—notably white supremacy—the fact that these two groups use 
the same name is not a sufficient justification for treating it as a single movement. The 
Reconstruction-era Klan was more of an idea, while the early-twentieth century Klan was 
 
4 Parsons, 31–32; David Mark Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan, 3rd ed 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 8–9. 
5 Rory McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics, Social 
Movements, Protest, and Contention 32 (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2009).  
6 Tarrow, for example, defines movements as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and 
solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.” Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in 
Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics 
(Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3–4. He posits four properties: 
collective challenge, common purpose, solidarity, and sustained interaction. Tarrow, 4. Traugott takes a 
somewhat more capacious view. For Traugott, movements are defined by two criteria: positive solidarity 
and an antiinstitutional orientation. Mark Others point to a modern/pre-modern movement distinction. 
Melucci, for example, writes that contemporary movements “assume the form of solidarity networks 
entrusted with potent cultural meanings, and it is precisely these meanings that distinguish them so sharply 
from political actors and formal organizations next to them.” Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: 
Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, ed. John Keane and Paul Mier (London: 
Hutchinson Radius, 1989), 4. 
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more of an organization. To see why the distinction is important, a brief detour into social 
movement theory is necessary. 
 
A. Movement Theorists and the Klan 
Theories of movement formation have undergone three distinct developmental 
periods.  Classical theorists focused on collective discontent.7 But, beginning in the 
1970s, resource-mobilization theorists argued that collective grievance is largely 
irrelevant to movement formation. For them, the presence of sufficient resources makes 
ever-present grievances coalesce.8 Other more recent theorists have focused on the 
availability of a contingent political context—an opportunity—that provides the 
necessary conditions for movement formation.9 Both resource mobilization and political 
opportunity theorists deemphasize the importance of collective grievances. But the Ku 
Klux Klan is more complicated. Sociologist Rory McVeigh argues the dominant models 
do not fit right-wing movements, which tend to form among relatively privileged, 
resource-rich actors who are not subject to state repression.10 The key question is “what 
 
7 Herbert Blumer, “Collective Behavior,” in An Outline of the Principles of Sociology, ed. Robert E. Park 
(New York, NY: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1939); Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New 
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Pub, 
1995). 
8 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 
Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1212–41; John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 
“Appendix: The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization,” 
in Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays, ed. Mayer N. Zald and John D. 
McCarthy (New Brunswick, U.S.A: Transaction Books, 1987), 337–91. 
9 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,1930-1970, 2nd ed 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Herbert P. Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and 
Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science 16, 
no. 1 (1986): 57–85; Tarrow, Power in Movement. 
10 McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 35. 
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leads members of relatively privileged groups utilize preexisting organizational resources 
and to exploit preexisting political opportunities in order to restore, preserve, or expand 
their preexisting privileges[?]”11  
According to McVeigh, a slight reemphasis on the classical model helps explain 
the rise of right-wing movements. Collective grievance can play more of a causal role in 
the formation of right-wing movements than it does with movements that fit other 
models. McVeigh’s model, therefore, is a blend of the three dominant models.12 His 
model assumes that “power devaluation, resulting from structural change, produces shifts 
in interpretive processes which, in turn, lead to activation of organizational resources and 
exploitation of political opportunities.”13 His “power-devaluation model,” borrows from 
the frame-alignment theorists, who emphasized the role of collective cognitive 
frameworks among movement members.14 Frame-alignment theorists argue that 
movements are unlikely to occur unless individuals collectively perceive that social 
change is possible and desirable. McVeigh argues that power devaluation on its own does 
not lead to right-wing activism. This is why he finds the political process model 
insufficient. Rather, power devaluation shifts “individuals’ perceptions of their 
circumstances and provide opportunities to construct new interpretive frames that 
 
11 McVeigh, 35. 
12 McVeigh, 39. 
13 McVeigh, 39. 
14 David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 
American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (August 1986): 464, https://doi.org/10.2307/2095581. 
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generate support for right-wing mobilization.”15 According to McVeigh, this model 
captures the Ku Klux Klan that formed in 1915.  
But McVeigh’s model raises questions that leave its generalizability in doubt. The 
power devaluation model correctly emphasizes the ideological or cultural moment and 
individuals’ cognitive perception of it. McVeigh’s model can be juxtaposed against the 
political process model by its insight into the meaning of a political opportunity. Political 
opportunity theorists focus on contingent political structures. McVeigh points out, 
though, that this does not account for the ideational dimension. McVeigh’s critique 
implicitly suggests that a “political opportunity” means two things. First, it is the 
institutional, structural, or material opening that a movement can exploit. Second, an 
opportunity must have an ideational or cultural dimension. Political-process theorists take 
the first meaning but not the second. For McVeigh, the use of framing perspectives 
makes this application of the political process model to the Klan a mistake. The framing 
perspective “invites investigation into how members and leaders of social-movement 
organizations actively construct interpretive frames that encourages and inspire 
individuals to participate in collective action.”16 
It seems, then, that McVeigh’s model would suggest that for a movement to form, 
there must be both a political opportunity in the traditional sense—an institutional or 
material gap that a movement can take advantage of—and a moment of cultural or 
ideational opportunity. Without the perception of the loss of political power as a result of 
 
15 McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 43. 
16 McVeigh, 43. 
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some societal shift, there would be no right-wing movement.17 There is an important 
parallel here between this second meaning of a political opportunity and Abraham 
Lincoln’s impact on American politics. Political Scientist David Greenstone argues that 
one cannot understand Lincoln’s genius without noticing his linguistic and cultural 
project. According to Greenstone, focusing only on Lincoln’s policy choices would limit 
one’s ability to see what made Lincoln especially transformative. Rather, Greenstone 
focuses on Lincoln’s “persuasion,” his “broad gauged orientation toward politics and 
government.”18 In addition to making key policy choices, Lincoln was able to borrow 
ideas from two different strands of liberalism in American political culture—“reform” 
and “humanist” liberalisms. The source of Lincoln’s greatness, therefore, was his cultural 
achievement, namely his ability to retain certain elements of each strand of liberalism 
while he articulated a new cultural paradigm. Importantly, however, Greenstone 
emphasizes that this is not necessarily an institutional or material project. Lincoln took 
advantage of an opportunity to alter the grammar of politics. As Carla Hess, one of 
Greenstone’s students, writes in the introduction to The Lincoln Persuasion, (the book 
was completed by his students and then published posthumously) Greenstone believed 
that “if political actors were operating according to different versions of the rules, there 
would likely be times when some player or players must devise a means by which those 
different sets of rules could be reconciled or rewritten, else the polity could not 
 
17 Rory McVeigh and Kevin Estep, The Politics of Losing: Trump, the Klan, and the Mainstreaming of 
Resentment (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019). 
18 J. David Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism, Princeton Studies in 
American Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5. 
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continue.”19 The Civil War was one of those opportunities. According to Greenstone, 
Lincoln’s genius was that he was able to “devise[] the means to change some of the rules 
of the game of American politics so that a single American polity could continue to 
exist.”20  
Greenstone’s insight tells us that when studying movements, we need to pay 
closer attention to the moments where the grammar of politics or the rules of the game 
are up for grabs. Though they do not align perfectly, Greenstone’s point echoes this 
second meaning of a political opportunity—there must be an ideational or discursive 
moment that allows the movement to engage on a cultural level. Crucially, this suggests 
that scholars interested in movements must focus on the cultural and ideational terms of 
those moments and study how the movement, like Lincoln, engaged with that moment 
and was (or was not) able to refashion those terms.21 The problem, therefore, is that 
McVeigh’s power-devaluation model may not as easily be applied to every iteration of 
the Klan. Though his model may hold to explain the existence of the Klan narrowly 
construed, it cannot explain the variation between the Klans that resulted from their 
confrontation of differing political moments or grammars at different times. Once we see 
that there must be both a political opportunity in the traditional sense and an ideational or 
discursive one, we must inquire into the distinct discursive or ideational practices of each 
movement.  
 
19 Greenstone, xx. 
20 Greenstone, xx. 
21 Sarah Gaby and Neal Caren, “The Rise of Inequality: How Social Movements Shape Discursive Fields,” 




B. Klan or Klans? 
Though the Klan was mostly eradicated after 1872, it was re-founded in 1915. 
McVeigh and Estep apply McVeigh’s power-devaluation model to the Reconstruction-
era Klan as well as the early-twentieth century Klan.22 Borrowing a concept from 
sociologist Verta Taylor’s research on the postpartum depression movement in late-
twentieth century America, McVeigh and Estep describe the intervening period between 
the first two iterations of the Klan as one of “abeyance.”23 Most accounts treat each 
iteration of the Klan as part of a larger whole.24 Intuitively, this makes sense. The first 
two iterations of the Klan did form at moments that were similar culturally, or 
ideationally.25 The trouble, though, is that focusing on those two Klans responded very 
differently to their respective contexts and circumstances.  
The early-twentieth century Ku Klux Klan, whose founding was inspired by the 
valorization of the earlier Klan in the film Birth of a Nation,1915, was a structured, 
bureaucratic organization. It made no claim to be a subversive, terrorist organization. In 
fact, it publicly explicitly rejected that characterization. Hiram Evans, who served as 
Imperial Wizard beginning in late 1922, “framed the Klan as a bastion of moral certitude 
 
22 McVeigh and Estep, The Politics of Losing. 
23 McVeigh and Estep; Verta A. Taylor, Rock-a-by Baby: Feminism, Self Help, and Postpartum 
Depression (New York: Routledge, 1996); Verta Taylor, “Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s 
Movement in Abeyance,” American Sociological Review 54, no. 5 (October 1989): 761, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2117752. 
24 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism; McVeigh and Estep, The Politics of Losing. 
25 McVeigh and Estep, The Politics of Losing. 
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and uprightness, an organization that held itself to only the highest standards.”26 William 
Joseph Simmons, founder of the Klan in 1915 and Evans’s predecessor as Imperial 
Wizard, testified before the House Committee on Rules during its investigation into the 
Ku Klux Klan in October, 1921. Simmons declared that he was inspired to 
establish a fraternal, patriotic, secret order for the purpose of memorializing the 
great heroes of our national history, inculcating and teaching practical fraternity 
among men, to teach and encourage a fervent, practical patriotism toward our 
country, and to destroy from the hearts of men the Mason and Dixon line and 
build thereupon a great American solidarity and a distinctive national conscience 
which our country sorely stands in need of.27 
 
Simmons was adamant that his Klan was not a lawless, violent organization, but a civic 
organization designed to foster civic mindedness. 
If the Knights of the Ku-Klux Klan has been a lawless organization, as has been 
charged, it would not have shown the remarkable growth it has, for in the klan is 
as fine a body of representative citizens as there is in the United States. In each 
community where there is a klan will be found members from the leading citizens, 
men who stand at the forefront of their cities. These men would not stand for 
lawlessness.28 
 
Simmons also denied that the Klan was animated by religious and racial intolerance: “If 
the klan is to secure members on an anti-Roman Catholic, anti-Jew, and anti-Negro 
appeal, we do not want such members, and have never secured them in this way.”29  
 Motives aside, the Klan was a (somewhat) well-organized society. Headquartered 
at the Imperials Wizard’s residence, known as the “Imperial Palace,” on Peachtree Road 
in Atlanta, GA., the Klan took in roughly $25 million per year at its peak.30 It did so 
 
26 McVeigh and Estep, 175. 
27 U.S. Congress, House, “The Ku-Klux Klan,” § Committee on Rules (1921), 69. 
28 U.S. Congress, House, 72. 
29 U.S. Congress, House, 78. 
30 McVeigh and Estep, The Politics of Losing, 177. 
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through an elaborate recruiting scheme dreamed up by professional organizers Edward 
Young Clarke and Elizabeth Tyler, who were hired by Simmons in 1920 after several 
years of declining finances and stagnant membership.31 As a result of the new recruiting 
scheme, which enlisted “Kleagles” to find new members through an incentive structure 
that allowed Kleagles to keep part of new member initiation fees ($10), membership 
skyrocketed in 1921. McVeigh and Estep write that the Klan was at this point 
unquestionably a pyramid scheme.32 The Klan—that had only 2,000 members during its 
first five years—gained 48,000 new members in three months.33 The Klan published a 
newspaper, the Imperial Night-Hawk, and distributed it to its members. The Klan was 
involved in national politics too. It drew members from both parties and expected them to 
place Klan loyalties over partisanship.34 Though immigration was the Klan’s principal 
policy issue, it had opinions on a wide range of policy domains. It supported the 
formation of the Federal Department of Education, mostly because of its potential impact 
on Catholic parochial schools.35  
 The original, Reconstruction-era Klan, was entirely different. In fact, 
“organization” may be too strong a descriptor. While the later Klan was able to organize 
an enormous fourth of July gathering for Klan members outside Kokomo, Indiana that 
was attended by tens (or hundreds—estimates vary) of thousands of people from across 
the United States, the Reconstruction-era Klan was barely more than a decentralized 
 
31 McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 21. 
32 McVeigh and Estep, The Politics of Losing, 176. 
33 McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 21. 
34 McVeigh and Estep, The Politics of Losing, 35. 
35 McVeigh and Estep, 35. 
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pattern of violence using the same label. Unlike the later Klan, the Reconstruction-era 
Klan involved very little lateral coordination across county or state lines. It derived its 
power not from a vast organizational network or enormous funds, but from myth—a 
myth that was only relevant at a particular historical moment, namely during 
Reconstruction. According to historian Elaine Fritz Parsons, historians have “found no 
significant evidence that Ku-Klux organizations coordinated with each other beyond the 
level of a few adjoining counties: most dens were short-lived local groups without any 
meaningful organizational connections to one another.”36 At the same time, the popular 
texts and newspapers “sensationalized the Klan by portraying it as a vast conspiracy.”37 
For this reason, Parsons argues the Reconstruction-era Klan is more of an idea than an 
organization.  
 This is a critical distinction. To be sure, the early-twentieth century Klan was very 
much an organization. Yet during Reconstruction, local groups attached the label “Ku-
Klux” to violence they no doubt would have committed otherwise. The label indicated to 
victims, observers, northerners, and to the attackers themselves, that the violence was part 
of a broader national narrative. In Union County, South Carolina, for example, though the 
label “Ku Klux” was being used in the press available to its residents beginning in 1868, 
it was not fully embraced by attackers—or, in fact, their victims—until 1870.38 
 
36 Parsons, Ku Klux: The Birth of the Klan During Reconstruction., 203. 
37 Parsons, 203. 
38 Parsons, 276–80. 
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During Reconstruction, the violence itself had a meaning somewhat independent 
to the idea of “Ku-Klux.” The violence served an immediate purpose to those committing 
it: the intimidation of political enemies—a meaning inextricably bound up with questions 
of slavery and race. So, the violence itself did of course have “pragmatic utility primarily 
to those who were committing and supporting it,” as well as to its victims.39 Importantly, 
however, the idea of the Ku-Klux “had practical utility at various times and in various 
ways to the Ku-Klux themselves, to white southerners who supported them, to a broad 
northern audience, to Republican partisans, and even to victims of southern racial or 
political violence.”40  
 Two important distinctions can be drawn between the first two iterations of the 
Klan that suggest the extant movement models, including the power-devaluation model, 
fall short. First, the models cannot explain the timing of the adoption of the label “Ku-
Klux.” Again, adopting the label was something southern whites did on their own, and 
for a specific reason. They were not exercising their membership in a formal 
organization. They paid no membership dues and received no newsletter or invitations to 
social gatherings in return. Second, the models do not explain the variation in the level 
and style of violence between the two groups. Both groups embraced certain 
performative traditions, as shown by, for example, their costumes and the titles of their 
leaders—Imperial Wizard, Grand Goblin, Grand Cyclops, etc. However, the early-
twentieth century Klan tended to publicly disavow violence, while violence was perhaps 
 
39 Parsons, 182. 
40 Parsons, 182. 
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a necessary characteristic of the groups of people who adopted the “Ku-Klux” label 
during Reconstruction. 
 Movements engage discursively with their environments.41 Because the first and 
second iterations of the Klan were organized differently in different historical contexts, it 
should come as no shock that there are striking ideational or discursive distinctions 
between them.42 Consider the performative style of the Reconstruction-era Klan. 
According to Parsons, what gave Ku-Klux violence (as opposed to similar violence that 
did not use the label) its unique power was the “rich networks of dark cultural meaning 
with which Ku-Klux surrounded this moment of pain and violence.”43 For those who 
identified with the Klan, the violence alone was insufficient. Attackers believed it was 
imperative that victims and those who heard about the attacks “recognize and fear them 
as larger than single local events.”44 The styles of Ku-Klux violence during 
Reconstruction was highly localized. Because, unlike with the second iteration of the 
Klan, the label and style was adopted by people who learned of the Klan through national 
newspapers rather than interpersonal networks, Ku-Klux attackers blended the styles they 
saw mentioned in the papers with local traditions: “A Ku-Klux was a man who decided to 
adopt as his own an identity he had read about in the paper.”45 This practice was layered 
on top of the crisis of identity that attackers believed they faced during Reconstruction. 
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Ku-Klux saw the performative attacks as a means to reassert antebellum white 
paternalism. The costumes and styles they adopted were caricatures of the identities they 
sought to overcome. For example, Reconstruction-era Ku-Klux sometimes assumed the 
characteristics and identity of animals. Interestingly, however, they often chose to dress 
as domestic animals (cows, mules, and goats) rather than savage animals or mystical 
creatures.46 
Because during this time Southerners were perceived as backwards when 
compared to Northerners, Ku-Klux embraced performative practices that enabled them to 
“push against this definition, marking themselves not as backward-looking planters but 
rather as modern men.”47 As Parsons explains, the costumes and traditions were 
embraced by Klan attackers “to define themselves and their victims as compliant within 
the new postslavery order.”48  
The first two iterations of the Klan were founded during times of social and 
economic recalibration, when protestant whites believed their power was being 
deconstructed. However, each organization was quite different. They responded in 
markedly different ways to similar economic and social situations. Though the existing 
models of movement formation may be able to explain the rise of the Klans themselves, 
they cannot explain why the Reconstruction-era Klan was couched in myth, secrecy, 
claims to fantastical feats and underground networks, while the Second Klan was a 
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public, tightly-organized political organization that publicly disavowed racial violence 
(though, of course, privately condoning it). Attuning to the particular cultural moment 
and how each movement responded discursively and ideationally suggests that the first 
two iterations of the Klan cannot always be treated as two parts of a larger whole. While 
they used the same label and were animated by many of the same ideas, they were very 
different movements.  
This is not to say that scholars who treat the first two iterations of the Klan as part 
of a larger whole are incorrect. Rather, it is that focusing on the differences reveals that 
much more attention needs to be paid to the particular discursive style of movements. 
The models themselves raise important questions about the importance of the discursive 
brand of each Klan (and perhaps of movements writ large). The point is that each Klan 
had distinct discursive styles because each confronted a unique ideational or cultural 
moment in American history. Studying how cultural and discursive practices are imbued 
with meaning can reveal how those practices can operate as causal variables.49 It is 
therefore necessary to ask what relevance the disparate cultural and discursive practices 
of these two Klans has for our understanding of politics and political development. 
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II. PERFORMATIVES, MEANING-CREATION, AND THE 
KLANS’ SUCCESS 
Ideas and discourse are not simply epiphenomenal of political action. To be sure, 
ideas and discourse are often reflective of underlying doctrines of governance. However, 
as Jeffrey Tulis points out, political rhetoric is also “reflective of something more 
fundamental. But that more fundamental phenomenon is intimately bound up with 
rhetoric itself; it is the idea or set of ideas that legitimates political practice.”50 So, the 
question becomes, what are the consequences of drawing the distinction between the first 
two Klans on discursive grounds? What can that tell us about the role ideas and discourse 
play in American politics?  
Notably, we are offered an opportunity to study how successful the 
Reconstruction-era and early-twentieth century Klans were. However, I am less 
concerned with whether the Klans achieved their policy, material, or institutional goals 
than with their discursive or ideational goals. If the Klan successfully engaged with and 
reshaped the language or discourse of their time, then it was successful. If the Klan’s 
discourse served a purpose, then it was successful. Recall that Greenstone describes 
Lincoln’s successful reshaping of ideational strands. Political scientist Stephen 
Skowronek, too, describes a similar dynamic in American politics.51 According to 
Skowronek, Woodrow Wilson was able to reappropriate certain patterns of racism and 
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liberalism in the American political tradition. His, too, was a successful ideational or 
discursive project. The Reconstruction-era Klan did something similar, but it seems the 
early-twentieth century Klan did not.  
 
A. “Ku-Klux” Did Discursive Work 
The Reconstruction-era Klan was engaged in a performative project. Importantly, 
I mean performative in two senses. First, as the last section explained, the Klan attackers 
took on a particular style. They wore costumes, borrowed ideas and traditions from 
minstrel and carnival traditions as well as from popular culture. Their attacks were 
typically drawn out, elaborate, and frequently involved choreographed moves like the 
relocation of the victim from their home before the violence began. “Performative” in this 
sense means theatrical or dramatic.  
Second, though, the Klan was engaged in meaning-creation. Using the label “Ku-
Klux” did not just mean referring to an existing organization. Being a Ku-Klux did not 
just signify the attacker belonged to an organization. Rather, being a Ku-Klux both 
carried and declared a broader meaning. Ku-Klux became a synecdoche for problems of 
white masculinity and domination, Democratic party politics, and the proper role of the 
federal government. Ku-Klux was a declaratory enterprise of meaning creation. 
“Performative” in this sense is the way J.L. Austin used it.52 This second meaning 
concerns me here.  
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 22 
J.L. Austin spoke of language as an activity. Pointing out that certain phrases are 
not referential but an act themselves, Austin posited a theory of “performative 
utterances.”53 A typical example is promising. When someone says, “I promise,” they are 
not referring to our state of mind or an ongoing activity. Rather, they are performing the 
act of promising. Although, as Austin later acknowledged, speakers are not always 
performing the action named in their speech. They are, though, always performing an 
action.54 Determining the meaning of that action requires engaging in a language game.55 
The performative aspects of language, therefore, have consequences for how we can 
understand political speech and action. It brings to the fore the “work” that a particular 
discourse can do: “how the use of words, the understanding of abstract concepts, and the 
enactment of everyday practices produce specific logics and generate observable political 
effects.”56 By invoking the concept of “performatives,” therefore, we are offered a tool to 
study the ways in which practices or ideas can develop an independent meaning. 
Discourse and ideas on their own can produce meanings independent of those 
offered by the people who use them. In her study of nationalism in Yemen, political 
scientist Lisa Wedeen observes that the meaning of everyday practices of nationalism 
goes beyond what it signified to those who performed them. Even in the absence of 
strong state institutions that typically contribute to a growth in national identity, 
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nationalism developed in Yemen. It developed through a series of performative practices 
that denoted a logic of their own. Wedeen argues that the importance of those everyday, 
performed practices of nationalism is not just in the meaning they held for those who 
practiced them. Rather, they were also important “in the ways in which they constitute 
the self through his or her performance as an explicitly national…person in the absence 
of a strong state or an institutionalized, procedural democracy.”57 Focusing narrowly on 
the institutional attachments or presence of democratic features misses the crucial role the 
discourse and practice of nationalism played in Yemen. The discourse of nationalism did 
work by creating a nationalism and democratic practices that, to the untrained eye, appear 
epiphenomenal to the undemocratic institutions.  
Something similar happened with the Ku Klux Klan. Facing the loss of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction in full swing, the discourse and idea of Ku-Klux successfully 
constituted a resurgence of antebellum white dominance and political thought. As 
Parsons points out, “the idea of the Klan did two things. First, it “felt like a way for rural 
Democratic white southerners to move out of the Confederacy and into a new and 
integrated nation.”58 Second, it “served the purpose of sectional reconciliation and the 
construction of a shared set of political understandings between northerners and southern 
Democratic whites.”59 Like the practices of nationalism in Yemen, the enactment of Ku-
Klux in Reconstruction America did discursive work. It is in this way that the 
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Reconstruction-era Klan was successful. It successfully provided the ideational and 
discursive resources to confront the opportunity before it.  
The specific contextual meaning of “Ku-Klux” is the key. It cannot be said that 
the Klan was successful—materially, institutionally, or discursively—without noting that 
it was the relationship between the understanding of the political moment by those that 
invoked “Ku-Klux,” and the meaning of “Ku-Klux” itself. “Ku-Klux” had a specific 
logic, where “logic” denotes “how words and concepts make sense in specific contexts: 
their intelligibility comes from the ways in which language and institutions are embedded 
in a social world of iterative actions and performative practices.”60 “Ku-Klux” discourse 
was therefore not epiphenomenal. The dramatic and theatrical style of the political and 
racial violence served a purpose because it had a specific logic. The “Ku-Klux” idea 
served as the discursive vehicle for the transition to postwar America.  
By contrast, the early-twentieth-century Klan appeared to not embody a similar 
discursive logic. It was not, therefore, as successful in the discursive or ideational sense. 
During Reconstruction, “Ku-Klux” held a meaning independent of the group that invoked 
it or the violence it perpetrated. By contrast, the second iteration of the Klan that was 
founded in 1915 held little or no parallel ideational power. “Klan” referred to only the 
organization of the Ku Klux Klan. I do not mean that the early-twentieth century Klan 
was not engaged in any project of the construction of discursive meaning. They were.61 
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The Klan in the 1920s, like other fraternal organizations, offered opportunities for male 
bonding.62 The Klan offered an opportunity for men to compensate for the losses of a less 
gender-segregated economy.63 However, at this time, “Ku-Klux” was merely 
referential—it merely referred to the Klan. By contrast, during Reconstruction “Ku-Klux” 
was not only referential. Rather, the meaning of “Ku-Klux” was constructed contextually. 
Rather than “Ku-Klux” meaning only “the Klan,” it was the other way around. “Ku-
Klux” did not just mean “Klan.” The Klan meant “Ku-Klux.” The unique meaning of 
“Ku-Klux” during Reconstruction, therefore, requires some elaboration. 
 
B. The Meaning of “Ku-Klux” During Reconstruction 
As Parsons explains, during Reconstruction there were two “Ku-Klux.” First, 
there was the “embodied” Ku-Klux, which consisted of “thousands of real men on the 
ground inflicting real pain, injury, and death on the bodies of freedpeople and those who 
allied with them.”64 Second, there was the “disembodied Ku-Klux,” what I refer to here 
as the “idea” of Ku-Klux. This was the Ku-Klux that existed in public discourse. It was 
“produced by thousands of individuals who each spoke, wrote, drew, and performed their 
distinct idea of the nature and meaning of collective white-on-black violence.”65 By 
contrast, “Ku-Klux” in the early-twentieth century was not performative in the Austinian 
sense. It took on no independent, contextual meaning.  
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Invoking “Ku-Klux” was not a license to participate in racial and political 
violence. One need not call themselves Ku-Klux to participate in collective and 
coordinated racial and politically-motivated violence. Yet, invoking “Ku-Klux” was an 
act that enabled attackers to participate in a broader national conversation on nationalism, 
resistance to northern authority, white paternalism, and the role of the federal 
government. It signified something broader and apart from the violence itself, and the 
real, physcial pain it caused.  
The differences in the spread of the Klan during the two periods illustrate this 
point. Noticing the differences “alters our understanding of how and why so many white 
men would soon choose to call themselves Ku-Klux.”66 During Reconstruction, potential 
members of the Klan were seldom encouraged to participate in Ku-Klux violence because 
other Klansmen in nearby states or counties encouraged them to. The Klan’s spread was 
less the result of coordinated organization or word of mouth than of national media 
attention to southern Ku-Klux violence.67 Rather, national news media played a crucial 
role in the spread of information about the Ku Klux Klan. Racial and political violence 
was not Ku-Klux violence right up until the moment it was. The timing of the adoption of 
the “Ku-Klux” label is important. It demonstrates that its adoption held some meaning for 
those committing the coordinated racial and political violence. It suggests that by 
adopting the label “Ku-Klux,” the group calling themselves the Klan was meaning Ku-
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Klux. “Ku-Klux” could not refer to them prior to their invocation. Rather, they referred to 
it. 
It was not until over four years after the founding of the Ku Klux Klan in 1866 
that whites in Union County, South Carolina adopted the label “Ku-Klux” for their own 
violence. This was not a product of lack of information on the Klan, as newspapers 
available in the county were discussing Ku-Klux violence occurring elsewhere in the 
South by 1868.68 In late March, 1868, The Daily Phoenix of Columbia, SC. referred to 
the Ku Klux Klan as a “mysterious brotherhood” that is “spreading rapidly in Tennessee, 
North Alabama, and Kentucky.”69 In late May 1868, the same paper mocked the 
“Northern press” for printing reports of “what purports to be exposure of the secrets of 
the Ku Klux Klan.”70 Yet, Union County residents did not adopt the label “Ku-Klux” for 
their violence until November or December 1870.71 Though violence that resembled Ku 
Klux violence in motive and coordination existed before that date, attackers, victims, and 
witnesses alike tended to reject the label in the interim.72 
Why did “Ku Klux” not take hold immediately? Because the word and idea “Ku-
Klux” had great power. It signified something other than just racial or political violence. 
It meant more than even the performative style of an attack itself. Rather, by eventually 
choosing to declare themselves “Ku-Klux” and embody its forms, Union Countians and 
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others felt they were tapping into an additional resource. They were gaining power over 
black leaders and white Republicans they otherwise would not have.  
Consequently, “Ku-Klux,” held a meaning that its adopters surely did not always 
consciously realize. “Ku-Klux” meant a project of reassertion of white masculinity and 
patriarchy. Ku-Klux’s costumes—often involving animal characteristics, blackface, 
horns, bright colors, accents, traditionally-women’s clothing, and minstrel and carnival 
traditions—were not only to disguise the wearer’s identity during attacks. While a desire 
to conceal their identity and frighten superstitious victims surely served as partial 
motivation for the disguises, it cannot explain why they were so elaborate, nor can it 
explain the routinized, performative, and deliberate style of attack. It is not clear that the 
costumes themselves terrorized freedmen any more than the prospect of impending 
horrific violence. Rather, Ku-Klux were performing both for an audience of northerners 
and for themselves. Because Ku-Klux violence occurred early in Reconstruction, Parsons 
argues Ku-Klux members had “everything to gain by encouraging northerners to read 
their attacks as theatrical rather than political or military” for fear that “real” organized 
violence would trigger an immediate suppression effort.73 However, Ku-Klux also 
performed for themselves as a means to simultaneously parody and reassert southern 
masculinity and culture. Ku-Klux performance was “an expression of white southern 
men’s disempowerment and failure as patriarchs after the war.”74 The particular style of 
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Ku-Klux attacks was an attempt to push against the definition of Southerners as 
backwards or antiquated. “Ku-Klux” was a performance of white masculinity. 
Ku-Klux also came to symbolize a process of forced modernization. Ku-Klux 
meant modernization through performance. It symbolized a blending of southern cultural 
forms with northern authority. It meant reluctant white acquiescence to northern power, 
but only as a fierce discursive tradition was preserved. Thus, for Parsons, the Klan and 
the idea of Ku-Klux “took the form of white southern resistance to northern authority 
while serving as white southerners’ contribution to a unified culture.”75 
“Ku-Klux” became a proxy for the debate over the power of the national 
government. The media played an essential role in the development of this aspect of the 
meaning of “Ku-Klux.” Though the Klan is typically associated with the American 
South, Northerners molded its development. Were it not for popular texts and northern 
newspapers that described the Klan in fantastical, often mystical language, the Klan, 
according to Parsons, “probably would have remained just one of many contemporary 
local southern slicker groups.”76 This is no doubt in part due to the fascination in 
American political culture with conspiracy, sensationalist fiction, and demonization.77 
Many northerners were fascinated by the performative style of the Klan, as well 
as by the mystery and secrecy that surrounded it. As a result, the presence of Klan 
violence symbolized a shortcoming of the American state. It meant an expansion of state 
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capacity was warranted. However, part of the Klan’s success was its deliberate campaign 
of misinformation and secrecy.78 Very little information exists even today on the 
identities of perpetrators of Klan violence. This misinformation campaign served as a 
successful shield against justification for a crackdown by the national government (for a 
time, of course). Ku-Klux’s style simultaneously justified and parodied the new 
American state. It “mirrored much that seemed threatening about the new state: its use of 
violence, its allegedly highly organized and top-down structure, the often opaque and 
arcane nature of its decision-making process.”79 The Klan and the idea of “Ku-Klux” 
soon morphed into a synecdoche for the debate over the power of the postwar state. 
Notably, Parsons finds that when “Ku-Klux” appeared in newspaper articles between 
1868 and 1872, the article was more likely than not referring to it in the context of 
“broader discussions of the postwar state.”80  
Both northern and southern audiences were fascinated by stories of the Klan’s 
activities. It is no surprise, then, that the frequency of stories about the Klan in the 
national press exploded in 1868. At the same time, though, many of these stories either 
held very little or incorrect information. The Klan consistently and deliberately supplied 
misinformation on its activities. Secrecy and myth were essential aspects of the Ku-Klux 
idea. They helped the Klan itself seem like a more pervasive force than it really was and 
served to mask the identity of members of the Klan. In fact, what most contemporaries 
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claimed to know about the Klan came from the national press even though it constructed 
an inaccurate narrative of the Klan. Nevertheless, the idea of Ku-Klux served as a proxy 
for readers’ ideas about southern politics. Parsons writes that the label of Ku-Klux 
“provided an effective means through which accounts of individual acts of the violent 
oppression of freedpeople could become more than anecdotes, aggregating into a 
systematic, and therefore potentially political issue.”81  
Stories about the Klan did not hit the national press until early 1868 but did not 
become frequent until mid-year. Reporters for national presses often borrowed ideas and 
even stories from local papers. But local papers were a victim of the misinformation 
campaign, or sometimes willing participants. The Daily Phoenix of Columbia, South 
Carolina wrote in late-April, 1868:  
If the Ku Klux Klan regale themselves with fresh African blood, drunk out of a 
radical skull, so the Loyal Leagues are said to be fond of secession blood, drunk 
out of a copperhead’s skull. But there is one difference—the Ku Klux Klan are 
thought to be disembodied spirits—the spirits of the Confederate dead—who, at 
midnight, rise from their graves, and roam about to avenge themselves upon the 
authors, black and white, of the insults and injured heaped upon the land they died 
for. They are a terror, it is said, only to evil-doers.82 
 
The next month, the same paper wrote of “…the frightful myth, the Ku Klux Klan.”83 
Newspapers participated in the construction of a Ku-Klux narrative. The Ku-Klux idea 
was itself a project of legibility.84 It served as an organizing category—a label that made 
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“instances of antifreedmen violence legible not only to the state but also to a national 
newspaper readership.”85 So, when the narratives of misinformation and myth 
constructed by the local papers wormed their way into national papers, a foundation 
existed that could be built upon and reified by a larger readership audience.  
 The first time the Ku Klux Klan appeared in the New York Times was January 20, 
1868. The Times referred to the Klan as a “rebel organization.”86 Parsons explains that 
this characterization of the Klan—an “organization”—that connoted structure and 
coordination over chaos and violence stuck.87 The Klan as described in the national press 
consistently emphasized its “coordination and discipline” instead of, for example, the 
“thuggish nature of its members” or the “savage frenzy of their violence.”88 The Klan 
strolled onto the pages of the national news as a fully formed organization, despite the 
fact that there “never was much Ku-Klux organizational infrastructure to reveal and 
understand.”89 Nevertheless, popular understandings of the Klan fell in line.  
 Though newspapers often depicted the Klan as a well-coordinated organization, 
they also contributed to the secrecy and myth surrounding it. The “Ku-Klux” idea in turn 
constructed the Klan’s perceived reality. Yet despite frequent descriptions of the Klan as 
organized and disciplined, American readers seemed to have “remarkable difficulty” 
coming to a consensus about the status of the Klan.90 As Parsons explains, despite the 
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federal government’s efforts to suppress the Klan—especially after the passage of the 
three Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871—and newspaper investigations, “the most 
fundamental question about the Ku-Klux—whether it existed at all—remained unsettled 
even in mainstream public discourse.”91 One cause of this persistent misinformation and 
confusion was the Klan’s deliberate publicity strategy. Playing into the “Ku-Klux” idea, 
Klan members often published accounts of their actions or appeared in public 
processions, but did everything they could to keep the details of their behavior and 
actions a mystery. The culture of dishonesty about the character and frequency of Ku-
Klux activity contributed to a sense of mystery and confusion. This combined with the 
tendency among newspapers sympathetic to Democratic causes to downplay the 
relevance or even existence of the Klan and an embrace of norms of journalistic 
responsibility that caused writers to state the lack of reliability of their information.  
 The result was that the Klan, powered by the aura surrounding what “Ku-Klux” 
really was, received a mythic, fantastical, and even reverent space in American political 
discourse. One New York Times correspondent referred to Ku-Klux as “a phantom of 
diseased imagination.”92 Parsons summarizes the role the Ku-Klux idea played in 
American political discourse: 
The Ku-Klux was a looming but always obscured presence in American political 
discourse. Americans refused either to look away from the Ku-Klux or to 
acknowledge with certainty that they had finally seen it. The image of the ghostly 
and metaphors of ghostliness were central both the Ku-Klux self-presentation and 
to its representation by politicians and by newspaper and other popular media.93 
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The meaning and weight of the of Ku-Klux idea was an essential aspect of its power. The 
organization’s use of the label altered both the meaning of the organization and the 
violence it committed. Though the violence had an immediate purpose to those 
committing it, “Ku-Klux” violence had an additional goal: “to influence the broader 
society beyond their immediate victims.”94 
Through its very use or utterance, “Ku-Klux” meant much more than just the 
mythic and amorphous organizations that invoked it. For southern whites involved in 
coordinated, planned racial and political violence, the decision to adopt the identity and 
invoke the “Ku-Klux” label was important. Whether they wanted to or not adopting “Ku-
Klux” asserted much more than a new site of violence. It also declared white southern 
masculinity, patriarchy, modernization, and caricatured the national state. “Ku-Klux” 
performed because it “enact[ed] what it name[d].”95 It held a meaning beyond a reference 
to the people that used it. It did discursive work. 
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III. IDEAS, DISCOURSE, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
The discourse of “Ku-Klux” changed American politics. It did not directly cause a 
policy change, nor did it directly contribute to any formal institutional change at all. Of 
course, the existence of the Ku Klux Klan and its violence lead to several congressional 
hearings and eventually the passage of a series of Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871, 
one of which is often referred to as the “The Ku Klux Klan Act.”96 But even the 
abandonment of Reconstruction by both the Supreme Court and Congress had other 
causes, too.97 Though the Supreme Court’s creation of the state action doctrine in The 
Civil Rights Cases,98 its subsequent gutting of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in in 
The Slaughterhouse Cases,99 and its striking down of a key provision of the Enforcement 
Act of 1871 in United States v. Harris (often called the Ku Klux Case)100 all contributed 
to the demise of the Reconstruction project, “Ku-Klux” cannot take all, most, or perhaps 
even any credit. These cases drew heavily on antebellum ideas about citizenship, which 
can be distinguished from “Ku-Klux,” though they share some similar themes. 
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More precisely, “discursive work,” does not align with what political scientists 
have told us about political change. While scholars of political development are typically 
among the first to point out that ideas matter for political change, they have been slow to 
explain how and why they matter.101 When ideas or discourse enter the picture, they are 
still treated as justifications or explanation for material and institutional political action. 
They still hold fast to the ontological hierarchy: idea (or its expression in discourse), 
actor, institution.  
 For example, political sociologist Pamela Brandwein in Reconstructing 
Reconstruction uncovers how individual justices’ interpretations of historical events 
animated their jurisprudence.102 Justice Miller’s ideas about what the Civil War was 
really about became embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence through his 
decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases.103 Brandwein studies the construction of historical 
meaning, so ideas play a central role. However, in Brandwein’s account, without a human 
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vehicle like Justice Miller, those ideas about the meaning of historical events may never 
have become embedded in American jurisprudence. While ideas played a central role in 
her account, they are still ontologically prior to actors.  
Similarly, political scientist John Dearborn uncovers the role of ideas about 
presidential representation in the construction of the modern presidency.104 But Dearborn 
too holds to the same ontological hierarchy: idea, actor, institution. Dearborn emphasizes 
the “ideational foundations” of institutions.105 For Dearborn, the ideational foundations of 
institutions can be revealed in two ways. First, “a particular institutional choice made by 
political actors—as compared to available alternatives—shows how an idea can affect or 
generate an institution, even if the idea in itself is not the proximate cause of reform.”106 
Second, “the reliance of an institution on an assumption is demonstrated by its durability 
in the face of doubt in its ideational foundation.”107 Dearborn shows that ideas can act as 
the foundation for an institution. It does so, though, through the choices of political actors 
who are motivated by the ideational tradition. So for Dearborn, too, the ontological 
hierarchy lives on.  
Political scientists Berk and Galvan offer one of the most nuanced approaches to 
institutional change. Rather than trying to derive accounts of change from theories of 
order, they suggest setting aside “structuralist commitments” in favor of a 
reconceptualization of institutions “as not prior to, exogeneous from, or determinative of 
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action, but as the raw materials for action….”108 Doing so requires “rethinking 
institutions experientially, and…conceptualizing rules as skills.”109 It shifts toward an 
“experiential account of institutions,” which leaves room for scholars to see and account 
for behavior that is not normally taken as a driver of change.110 They call this approach 
“creative syncretism.” They define it as “an invitation to unshackle theories of 
institutional change from the constraints of structuralism and the related confines of 
agency as an overdetermined or residual category.”111 Yet this definition, too holds fast to 
the same hierarchy. If ideas and discourse enter the picture at all, it through the process of 
institutional change.  
To be sure, this is not necessarily problematic. These scholars have uncovered 
interesting ways that ideas have influenced political development and have developed 
new tools to study institutional change. Further, these definitions accord well with the 
dominant definition of “political development” in the literature, Orren and Skowronek’s. 
For them, “political development” means a “durable shift in governing authority.”112 
However, this approach cannot capture the discursive work of “Ku-Klux.” Notably, it 
cannot easily capture Greenstone’s description of Lincoln’s restructuring of the two 
strands of American liberalism. Though Orren and Skowronek correctly point out that the 
effects of the “Lincoln persuasion” were eventually abandoned as Reconstruction 
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puttered out, it cannot be said that Lincoln had no enduring discursive or ideational 
impact on American politics. To dismiss Greenstone’s analysis as merely at the level of 
ideas and therefore disconnected from political development because those ideas were 
later abandoned is to underplay the importance of Lincoln’s discursive project. Even if 
those ideas failed to become fully institutionalized during Reconstruction, they still did 
some important work in their own time. If, for social movement theorists, a “political 
opportunity” encapsulates both a material, institutional opening and a discursive or 
ideational one, then why do scholars of political development only focus on the former? 
To treat the discursive project of the Reconstruction-era Klan as merely at the level of 
ideas and as not contributing to political development because those ideas failed to 
become fully institutionalized as the federal government stamped out the Klan in the 
early-1870s also means ignoring the work those ideas did, especially for those who 
invoked them. What may have happened if “Ku-Klux” never developed and did no work? 
Might Reconstruction have taken a different turn?   
 Surely the discursive work of “Ku-Klux” is noteworthy for any understanding of 
political development. That the white supremacists in Charlottesville employed some of 
the same sentiment—an aggrieved group trying to reassert their perceived lost power 
through performative rhetoric—illustrates this. It is worth asking, therefore, if “you will 
not replace us,” is a similar attempt to engage a political moment discursively. Is their 
language only a justification for attempted institutional change, or does it contribute to an 
ongoing construction of the meaning of Whiteness in the United States? Seeing the 
rhetoric of white supremacy in its historical context reveals that the Charlottesville 
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rhetoric may be more damaging than typically assumed. Dismissing it as only existing in 
a dark corner of American political culture means treating it as epiphenomenal—as not 
doing any discursive work. The remaining question, though, is whether contemporary 
white supremacists are more like the Klan of Reconstruction or the Klan of the early-
twentieth century. It depends, as I have argued, on the contextual meaning of the 
discourse they espouse, and whether it is doing any independent discursive work. It may 
be too early to say definitively. To be sure, it is not just a question of the predominance 
and spread of white supremacist rhetoric. Rather, it is a question of whether that rhetoric 
is successfully doing work.  
 One irony is that the Klan’s discursive project is that it often drew explicitly on 
the Constitution. Throughout American history, groups calling themselves the Ku Klux 
Klan have tended to justify their actions as a defense of American constitutional ideals.113 
While generations of Constitutional theorists would correctly point out that the Klan is 
incorrect to try to ground its rhetoric in the Constitution, that ultimately may not matter. 
Whether their rhetoric is nonsense or not, it can do discursive work. Though the 
Constitution also embodies ideals that most see as wholly inconsistent with everything 
the Klan stands for, it curiously also creates opportunities for these ideals to be undercut. 
The institutions it establishes interact with American political ideas in a way that prevents 
wholesale restructuring of the political landscape. Perhaps the the deepest irony of all is 
that the Constitution prevents the realization of its own most closely-held ideals.  
 




 More often than not, political change is slow, incremental, and layered. This in 
part because institutional and ideational orders are constantly in flux and often in 
tension.114 But not all political change happens at the level of rules, policies, or 
institutions. Political change can be observed at the level of ideas and discourse as well. 
The trick, of course, is recognizing when ideas do not rise to the level of a “moment” of 
political development—or when they fail to contribute to political development—and 
when they do. Ideas and their expression through discourse can impact political 
development in two ways. First, the ideas can be institutionalized. The idea can find 
expression in formal rules and organizational outcomes. Patterns can be recognized. The 
idea can undergird and institutional transformation. Second, as I have argued here, ideas 
and discourse can do independent work in ways that impact political development. If an 
actor or group is vying for political change, whether they realize it or not, their project 
may be taking place on two fronts. First, they are likely vying for a policy or rule change. 
Second, though, they may be engaged in a project of discursive recombination. They may 
be attempting to change politics through language. If successful, this can have two 
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observable effects. First, it can also serve to be another idea that can find institutional 
expression. Second, though, it may be performative and do independent work outside of 
institutional expression. That is what the “Ku-Klux” idea did during Reconstruction. 
“Ku-Klux” served to perform and caricature antebellum white masculinity and declare 
the reunification process. It was a performative project of modernization.  
Rather than looking exclusively at which ideas and discourses were invoked by 
members of the Klan, I have examined the impact of the language of “Ku-Klux” itself on 
American politics. This opens up new opportunities to study the impact of language, 
including white supremacist language, on the development of American politics. When 
the white supremacists in Charlottesville in August, 2017 chanted, “You will not replace 
us,” they were attempting to engage in a process of discursive recombination. It was a 
performative project that declared an us. It had its own distinct logic and meaning. The 
harder question, though, is what impact that performative project had (or continues to 
have) on the American political landscape. It likely has impacted the meaning of 
whiteness—and, by extension, nonwhiteness—in America. It has helped define the terms 
of the what the white supremacists and their sympathizers—willing, unwilling, and the 
host of tacit, passive beneficiaries—perceive to be the state of politics that must be 
reclaimed. This may suggest the beginnings of an answer to the question “why does this 
understanding of whiteness persist in American political discourse”? Whereas “Ku-
Klux” discourse during Reconstruction acted as a panacea for many southern Whites who 
were reluctant observers to reunification, modern white supremacists do not believe their 
prospects are as grim.  
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During Reconstruction, southern Whites had just lost a civil war and seen their 
vision for the future of polity crushed before their eyes. Today, white supremacists have 
more hope. They see a president who is sympathetic (or at the very least, not 
unsympathetic) to their views placing their ideas at center stage. Reconstruction-era 
Klansmembers used “Ku-Klux” to declare power over what little ground they had left, 
unwilling to cede it all to the burgeoning postwar American state. It worked. Ku-Klux 
ideas took up a unique post in the American political tradition, and Reconstruction 
ultimately failed to live up to its aims. Today, white supremacists are not defending what 
little ground they have left, but on a likely-successful quest for more. There is reason to 
believe, therefore, that white supremacist ideas today may be even more damaging to 
American politics than they were during Reconstruction. The work “Ku-Klux” performed 
during Reconstruction was to make modernization and reunification easier to stomach for 
southern Democrats and white supremacists. Today, it is not softening the blow of an 
inevitable loss, but structuring a potential win. White it may be too early to observe 
exactly what work the rhetoric of those at Charlottesville, the shooters at, for example, 
the Pittsburgh synagogue in October, 2018 and El Paso Wal-Mart in August, 2019 
(among countless others) is doing, one thing is for sure. The rhetoric itself is an attempt 
to reshape the grammar of politics. It is an attempt to change politics through language 
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